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CASE NOTES
FEDERAL COURTS-THE PERSONAL VS. PROPERTY
RIGHTS DISTINCTION FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION
UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1343: THREE DECADES OF
CONTROVERSY MADE MOOT.
Legislation following the Civil War provided the basis for the federal
courts to assume the role as prime guarantors of individual liberty as
against infringement by the states.' Not until the twentieth century did
the federal courts really begin to assume the role; 2 and in the process of
carving out the form of federalism that was ultimately to emerge, through
increasing litigation brought under the Civil Rights Acts, 3 a significant
amount of judicial and academic effort has been spent in an attempt to
give proper scope to those Acts.4 Since Justice Stone's separate opinion
in Hague v. CIO in 1939, 5 dealing with the problem of the scope of the
Acts, both controversy and confusion have resulted from the attempt to
reconcile the federal jurisdictional provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1331 and §
1343(3) on the basis of distinguishing between personal liberties and
property rights in suits claiming jurisdiction under § 1343(3).6 That dis-
tinction as a basis for denying a federal forum for the protection of per-
sonal liberty from infringement by persons acting under color of state law
has now been repudiated by the Supreme Court.
Recently suit was brought under 28 U.S.C. §1343(3) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 19837 seeking a permanent injunction and declaratory relief, alleging that
1. See notes 13 to 25 infra.
2. See note 36 infra.
3. See notes 35 to 39 infra.
4. See notes 48 to 53 infra.
5. 307 U.S. 496, 518 (1939).
6. See generally WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §32 (2d ed. 1970);
Weschler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 225-28 (1948).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides: "Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or any other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
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the Connecticut attachment and garnishment statutes were unconstitutional
in light of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
Plaintiffs, representing other Connecticut residents similarly situated,
were low income wage earners whose checking and credit union accounts
were garnished without prior notice to the alleged debtors and without
giving the debtors an opportunity to be heard in their own defense.
Ms. Lynch, one of the plaintiffs, was employed, and on an income of
$69.00 per week supported herself and a son, while providing partial sup-
port to another son. She deposited funds in an employee credit union,
from which she made periodic withdrawals to purchase family needs.
When Ms. Lynch's account was garnished to satisfy a note held by defend-
ant Household Finance Corporation, she was unable to pay her rent and was
threatened with eviction.
Ms. Toro, a second plaintiff whose garnishment was subsequently re-
leased, was supporting herself and a son on $85.00 per week, derived
from her employment and public assistance. She regularly deposited her
weekly earnings in a checking account, which was garnished under the
Connecticut procedure to satisfy an alleged indebtedness to a former
landlord. As a result of the garnishment some of Ms. Toro's outstanding
checks were not honored, subjecting her reputation and credit to severe
damage, especially because two of the checks were written to creditors
holding security interests in her personal property. This sequence was
able to occur despite the fact that Ms. Toro had valid defenses against
the former landlord.
Plaintiffs were dismissed by a three-judge district court on the basis of
lack of jurisdiction under §1343(3).8 Following the Second Circuit's
reaffirmation of the personal-property rights distinction in Eisen v. East-
man,!' the district court held that access to funds in checking and savings
accounts is virtually indistinguishable from mere ownership of money, 10
hence a property right. As a property right, jurisdiction would have to be
based on §1331, requiring satisfaction of the minimum amount in con-
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac-
tion at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 28 U.S.C.
§1343(3) (1964) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: .. . To re-
dress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution
of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens
or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States ... "
8. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1111 (1970).
9. 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969).
10. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1111, 1114 (1970).
[Vol. XXII
1972] CASE NOTES 415
troversy requirement. The parties were of limited means and, as a result
of the personal-property rights distinction, were denied a federal forum in
which to vindicate important federal rights.
In an opinion rendered without Mr. Justices Powell and Rehnquist, the
Supreme Court reversed the district court dismissal and expressly rejected
the distinction between personal liberties and proprietary rights as a guide
to federal court jurisdiction under §1343(3).'' Lynch v. Househo!d
Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
The decision in Lynch is significant for at le.'st three reasons. First,
it lays to rest the controversy and confusion surrounding the personal-
property rights distinction in §1343 jurisdiction. Second, it accentuates
the trend whereby federal courts are increasingly looked to as the most
appropriate forum for vindication of constitutionally protected individual
rights, with the consequent recasting of the relation of federal and state
courts in a system of national federalism. Finally, it draws attention to
the near impossibility of attempting to treat property as anything other
than a personal right.
It is the purpose of this case note to briefly review the legislative and
court history of the personal-property rights distinction, noting the appli-
cation of the distinction by the courts up to Lynch and the inconsistencies
it had produced. Next, the unanimous opinion disposing of the personal-
property rights distinction will be analyzed, with particular emphasis on
the underlying policy arguments which might have been more thoroughly
commented upon by the Court. Lynch provides particular credence to
the American Law Institute proposal recommending elimination of the
amount in controversy requirement under §1331, and special considera-
tion will be given to this aspect of the decision's impact. Lastly, Lynch will
be considered as it takes its place in the evolution of modern federalism,
focusing on the scope of § 1983 protections after Lynch.
11. In the alternative, defendants had argued that given jurisdiction under
§1343(3), 28 U.S.C. §2283 (barring federal courts from granting injunctions to
stay proceedings in state courts) would bar issuance of an injunction to stay the
prejudgment garnishment. The Court rejected this application of §2283 on the
basis that the Connecticut prejudgment garnishment, Conn. Gen. Stat. §52-239
(1968), is not a proceeding in a state court. Three Justices dissented from the
majority on the §2283 question, arguing that plaintiffs should have been compelled
to pursue their constitutional attack in the state courts. In support of their argu-
ment, the dissent raised contentions which relate to the same questions of federalism
which underlay the continuing vitality and persistence of the personal-property
rights distinction. However, the issues regarding federalism in the context of §2283
have been diffused by the Court's recent holding that §1983 is an express excep-
tion to §2283. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
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HISTORY OF THE PERSONAL-PROPERTY RIGHTS DISTINCTION
The original Civil Rights Act of 1866,12 passed during the post Civil
War reconstruction era to protect all citizens in the exercise of basic civil
rights,' 3 is the origin of the present Civil Rights Act' 4 protecting individ-
uals against deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities under color
of state law. The constitutionality of the 1866 Act was established by
passage of the fourteenth amendment,' 5 one of three constitutional
amendments passed by Congress in response to the discriminatory "Black
Codes" of the South.' 6 Modeled after §1 of the original 1866 Act, Con-
gress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871,17 under the authority of §5
of the fourteenth amendment, to provide for the enforcement of that
amendment.' 8 It is the Act of 1871 from which §§1983 and 1343(3)
are directly derived. 19 Today, the substantive provisions of the Act are
contained in 42 U.S.C. §198320 and the jurisdictional counterpart in 28
U.S.C. §1343(3).21 These sections were first separated in 1875,22 and
in the evolutionary process leading to the present §§1983 and 1343(3)23
12. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
13. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969); Jones v. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 432 (1968); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-86 (1961). See
also CONo. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., App. 69 (1871) (Rep. Shellabarger).
14. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171, 183-85 (1961). See Gressman, The
Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 1323 (1952).
15. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171, (1961); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
509-10 (1939). See also CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., App. 313 (1871)
(Rep. Burchard).
16. Gressman, supra note 14, at 1323-26.
17. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
18. See CoNo. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68-70 (1871) (Rep. Shella-
barger).
19. §1983 was first enacted as §1 of the Civil Rights Act (also known as the
Ku Klux Klan Act) of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13. Of the five Civil Rights Acts
passed between 1866 and 1875, which include Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27
(1866); Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870); Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch.
99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871); Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871); and Act
of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875), only §1 of 17 Stat. 13, presently
§1983, remained [along with its jurisdictional counterpart §1343(3)] as a significant
basis for subsequent litigation.
20. See provisions of the statute set out in note 7, supra.
21. See provisions of the statute set out in note 7, supra.
22. Rev. Stat. tit. 13, §§629(16), 563(12), 1979 (1875).
23. In 1871 Congress began codification of the then existing law under separate
titles in the Revised Statutes. The jurisdictional provisions of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 were placed in the Judicial Code of the Revised Statutes of 1875, granting
distinct jurisdiction for circuit and district courts. These separate jurisdictional
grants were merged when Congress abolished the circuit court original jurisdiction,
416 [Vol. XXII
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some changes were made in the precise phraseology of the two statutes. 24
This has caused some commentators to speculate as to newly imposed
limitations on the scope of §§1983 and 1343(3) respectively. 25  How-
ever, the Supreme Court has clearly enunciated that the purpose of the
Act of 1871 was singular in providing redress for the deprivation of any
rights secured by the fourteenth amendment, 26 and it follows that the
scope of § § 19 83 and 1343 (3) should be co-extensive.27
Congress expanded the national authority over matters previously re-
served for state courts with passage of the general jurisdictional statute in
the Judiciary Act of 1875,28 giving federal courts power to hear suits aris-
ing under article III, §2 of the Constitution.29 The provision is presently
embodied in 28 U.S.C. §1331.30 The reasons for the passage of the Ju-
Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087. The present §1343(3) jurisdictional
provision derives from the 1911 revisions, Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat.
1092 (1911), as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 41(12), (13), (14) (1940 ed.).
24. When the substantive provision was separated in the Revised Statutes of
1875, its language was altered to provide a remedy for deprivation of rights, privi-
leges and immunities secured by federal laws as well as by the Constitution. Rev.
Stat. §1979 (1875). However, the jurisdictional provision for circuit courts was
limited to deprivations of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights. Rev. Stat. §629(16)
(1875). The scope of the district court jurisdictional grant was worded exactly as
the substantive provision. Rev. Stat. §563(12) (1875). When the jurisdictional
provisions were merged in 1911, the equal rights limitation was retained. Act of
March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1092 (1911). For a discussion of the language
variances between §1343(3) and §1983 see Herzer, Federal Jurisdiction Over
Statutorily Based Welfare Claims, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. Lii. L. REV. 1, 7-16
(1970).
25. Comment, The Civil Rights Acts and Mr. Monroe, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 145
(1961); Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1285
(1953).
26. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
27. Note, Section 1343 of Title 28-1s the Application of the "Civil Rights-
Property Rights" Distinction To Deny Jurisdiction Still Viable?, 49 B.U.L. REv.
377, 383 (1969).
28. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (1875). With exception of a
short-lived attempt by Congress to give lower federal courts original jurisdiction
under the authority of Art. III, §1, in the Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, §11,
2 Stat. 92, repealed by Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, §1, 2 Stat. 132 (1801), the
Act of 1875 was the first time Congress broadly exercised its constitutional power
to give lower federal courts jurisdiction of all suits arising under the Constitution,
laws and treaties of the United States. Tennessee v. Union and Planters' Bank,
152 U.S. 454 (1893).
29. FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1928);
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 245-48 (1967).
30. 28 U.S.C. §1331 (1964) provides: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States .. "
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diciary Act of 1875 are obscure due to a lack of Congressional debate,31
but it has been regarded as simply another step in strengthening the fed-
eral government against the states during the post Civil War era. -2
Though not required by the Constitution, ever since the Judiciary Act of
17893 a minimum amount in controversy has been required in some
types of cases to invoke federal jurisdiction, including those which are
brought under §1331.,"
Early court interpretation of the fourteenth amendment was restric-
tive.3  The Civil Rights Acts passed to enforce the amendment were thus
infrequently used through the early twentieth century,-6 when most of
the Court's attention was directed to the development of rising economic
nationalism.' 7
The late 1930's was an era in which various special interest groups
were frequently seeking to achieve social change by engaging in public
expression of their ideas. 38  Often restricted by municipal authority as
threats to public tranquility, these groups sought to redress the depriva-
tion of their civil rights under the fourteenth amendment enforcement
acts, notably the predecessors of §§1983 and 1343(3). Thus it was that
the CIO, seeking to disseminate information regarding the new national
31. FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, supra note 29, at 66.
32. FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, supra note 29, at 59; Chadbourn and Levin,
Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 642-43 (1942);
Maury, The Late Civil War, Its Effect on Jurisdiction and On Civil Remedies Gen-
erally, 14 AM. L. REG. 129 (1875); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668,
673 (1963).
33. 1 Stat. 85 (1789). This Act also authorized Supreme Court appellate re-
view of federal question cases, but the jurisdictional authorization was not broadly
granted until the Act of 1875. See Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial
Power, 1863-1875, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 333, 348-49 (1969).
34. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §32 (2d ed. 1970). The jurisdic-
tional amount for federal question jurisdiction was $500 under Act of March 3, 1875,
ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470 (1875), and was successively increased in Act of March 3,
1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552 (1887); Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, §24, 36 Stat.
1087, 1091 (1911); and Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415
(1958) to its present level of $10,000.
35. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
36. See CURRIE, THE FEDERAL COURTS 427 (1968), discussing the companion
cases of Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317 (1884), and Pleasants v. Greenhow,
114 U.S. 323 (1884), which were the only two cases discussing the scope of the
predecessor of §1343(3) prior to Justice Stone's opinion in Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496 (1939). See also Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an
Adequate Federal Civil Remedy, 26 IND. L.J. 361 (1951).
37. Wiecek, supra note 33.
38. GUNTHER AND DOWLING, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1137 (8th ed. 1970).
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labor legislation, invoked the aid of federal courts in Hague v. CIO.'
In Hague, the Supreme Court found jurisdiction over the suit alleging
that city ordinances prohibiting the right to hold public meetings and dis-
tribute leaflets constituted deprivation of the rights of free speech and as-
sembly, though the Court did not express unanimity as to the basis of
their affirmance of the lower court. 0 Justice Stone filed a separate opin-
ion wherein he found it necessary to protect §1343(3) from being swal-
lowed up by the general federal question jurisdictional provisions of §
1331, 4 1 which would have had the effect of making the amount in con-
troversy requirement applicable to civil rights cases. Finding that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment guarantees to all per-
sons, regardless of citizenship, basic personal liberties including freedom
of speech and assembly, and that plaintiffs were thus authorized by the
Civil Rights Act of 187142 to sue in equity to restrain infringement of
those rights, Justice Stone then confronted the jurisdictional question as
to amount in controversy. Noting the parallel existence of the two juris-
dictional provisions, §§1331 and 1343(3), and that the language of
§1331 could be read to include §1343(3), Justice Stone apparently felt it
necessary to distinguish the two statutes so as to protect federal jurisdic-
tion over those suits brought under §1343(3) irrespective of the amount
in controversy requirement. He asserted that " . . . at least . . . [those]
suits in which the subject matter is one incapable of valuation . . ."
(emphasis added) 43 could be brought under §1343(3) without satisfying
any minimum amount in controversy requirement. He restated this
"harmonization" of the two statutes by saying that §1343(3) conferred
jurisdiction when ". . . the right asserted is inherently incapable of pe-
cuniary valuation, '4 4 and ". . . whenever the right or immunity is one
of personal liberty, not dependent for its existence on the infringement
of property rights. . . . ,,45 Ergo the personal-property rights distinc-
tion.46
39. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
40. Id. at 500, 518, 532, 533.
41. Id. at 518.
42. At the time of the Hague decision the present Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343 (3) was included in §24 (14) of the Judicial Code.
43. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 530 (1939).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 531.
46. Rather than treating the several phrases used by Justice Stone to describe his
concept as merely emphasizing language, some commentators have speculated as to
possible operative distinctions. See, e.g., Note, Section 1343 of Title 28-Is the
Application of the "Civil Rights-Property Rights" Distinction to Deny Jurisdiction
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As noted in Lynch,47 the Supreme Court has never as a majority ex-
plicity adopted the personal-property rights distinction in determining the
boundaries of §1343(3) jurisdiction. But the lower federal courts have
not had such a fortunate history: some have adopted the distinction, 48
others have rejected it,40 still others have ignored it altogether where it
might have been raised as an issue,50 and finally, some courts have recog-
nized the distinction but proceeded to grant jurisdiction where the right
involved was difficult to classify as either property or personal liberty.51
The Supreme Court, most notably when dealing with welfare rights, has
often not noticed the distinction where it might have been raised as an
issue.52 Further, the problems created by its application have evoked a
flood of commentary, generally critical of the distinction and its limita-
tion upon the operation of §1343(3) and frequently calling for the pre-
Still Viable?, 49 B.U.L. REV. 377, 380 (1969); Note, Civil Procedure: Section 1343
(3) Jurisdiction and the Property-Personal Rights Distinction, 1970 DUKE L.J. 819,
825 (1970).
47. 405 U.S. 538, 542 (1972).
48. E.g., Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68 (1900) (the case was Justice
Stone's single example of an action where §1343(3) did not apply); Bussie v.
Long, 383 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1967); Howard v. Higgins, 379 F.2d 227 (10th Cir.
1967); Gray v. Morgan, 371 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1966); Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d
323 (3d Cir. 1965); Hornbeak v. Hamm, 283 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd
mem., 393 U.S. 9 (1968); Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465
(N.D. Ill. 1967); Ream v. Handley, 259 F. Supp. 728 (7th Cir. 1966); Alterman
Transp. Lines v. PSC of Tenn., 259 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), aff'd mem.,
386 U.S. 262 (1967); Abernathy v. Carpenter, 208 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Mo. 1962),
aff'd mem., 373 U.S. 241 (1963).
49. E.g., Mansell v. Saunders, 373 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1967); McGuire v. Sad-
ler, 337 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1964); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964);
Joe Louis Milk Comp. v. Hershey, 243 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Il. 1965).
50. E.g., Barnes v. Merritt, 376 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1967); Birnbaum v. Trussell,
371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966); Cobb v. City of Maiden, 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir.
1953); Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control Commission, 160 F.2d 96 (6th Cir.
1947); Burt v. City of New York, 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946); Fuentes v. Fair-
cloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
51. E.g., Gold v. Lomenzo, 425 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1970); Escalera v. New York
City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970) (challenge to termination of
lease in public housing, where court found jurisdiction under §1343(3) because the
action involved deprivation of procedural due process, a civil right, which ulti-
mately led to the loss of a property right; Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284
(E.D. Pa. 1970); Roberge v. Philbrook, 313 F. Supp. 608 (D. Vt. 1970).
52. E.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); California Department of
Human Resources v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1970); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S.
416 (1967); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp.
1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 191 (1972). Also Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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cise holding handed down in Lynch.5"
The Second Circuit had been one of the most consistent adherents of
the personal-property rights distinction,5 4 confirmed by Judge Friendly in
Eisen v. Eastman.55 Recognizing the difficulties that an application of the
personal-property rights distinction necessarily entails,5 6 Judge Friendly
nevertheless felt compelled to follow Justice Stone in Hague by denying
§ 1343(3) jurisdiction in a suit which challenged the constitutionality of a
rent control law.5 7 Eisen was the case most prominently relied upon in
the district court's denial of jurisdiction in Lynch,5s thus leading to the ul-
timate demise of the distinction.
THE SUPREME COURT DISPOSES OF THE PERSONAL-PROPERTY
RIGHTS DISTINCTION
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.5 9 was an opportunity for the
Supreme Court to lay to rest the confusion some federal courts had
brought upon themselves by over-interpretation of Justice Stone's analysis
and to remove an outmoded impediment to vindication of federally guar-
anteed rights in the most appropriate forum. 60 The well-documented his-
53. Note, Another and Hopefully Final Look at the Property-Personal Liberty
Distinction of Section 1343(3), 24 VAND. L. REV. 990 (1971); Comment, Federal
Jurisdiction Under the Civil Rights Act-The Case Against the Personal-Property
Rights Distinction, 17 VILL. L. REV. 313 (1971); Note, Section 1343 of Title 28-
Is the Application of the "Civil Rights-Property Rights" Distinction Still Viable?,
49 B.U.L. REV. 377 (1969); Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Act, 66
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1289-91 (1953).
54. Gold v. Lomenzo, 425 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1970); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d
560, 566 (2d Cir. 1969); McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1969). See
Hornbeak v. Hamm, 283 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd mem., 393 U.S. 9
(1968).
55. 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969). But see Gold v. Lomenzo, 425 F.2d 959 (2d
Cir. 1970), where Judge Friendly granted jurisdiction under §1343(3) in a suit seek-
ing to enjoin enforcement of an order by the New York Secretary of State sus-
pending plaintiff's real estate license. Judge Friendly recognized the personal-
property rights distinction but did not apply it because he considered that a busi-
ness license could be interpreted as involving either personal liberty or property
rights.
56. 421 F.2d 560, 565 (2d Cir. 1969).
57. "We therefore hold, although with a good deal less than complete assurance,
that Justice Stone's Hague formulation, generously construed, should continue to be
regarded as the law of this circuit." Id. at 566.
58. 318 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Conn. 1970).
59. Id.
60. The implications of Lynch were quickly recognized while it was pending
before the Supreme Court. See Note, Another and Hopefully Final Look at the
Property-Personal Liberty Distinction of Section 1343(3), 24 VAND. L. REV. 990
(1971).
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tories of §§1331 and especially 1343(3),61 recent Supreme Court deci-
sions dealing with vindication of rights containing mixed elements of per-
sonal liberty and proprietary interest,62 continued conflict of outcome in
lower federal courts which dealt with the personal-property rights ques-
tion,6' and increasing acceptance of the concept of property as a truly per-
sonal right,"4 all provided persuasive argument for simply dispensing with
Justice Stone's formulation as no longer necessary. Further, the jurisdic-
tional question of a purported limit to §1343(3) certainly posed for
the court important policy considerations in terms of its impact on the
administration of federal courts,"," and more importantly on the role of fed-
eral courts in the American federal system as it evolved from the Recon-
struction Era.
In concluding that there is no limit to §1343(3) jurisdiction in terms
of a personal-property rights dichotomy, Justice Stewart speaking for the
Court, relied on all of the above arguments and dealt briefly with the im-
pact on federal court administration:
[Tihis court has never adopted the distinction between personal liberties and propri-
etary iights as a guide to the contours of §1343(3) jurisdiction. Today we expressly
reject that distinction."6
Acknowledging that there is no basis for such a distinction in the legisla-
tive histories of either §1331 or §1343(3)6 7 to apply to specific kinds of
acts which deprive persons of their individual rights, 68 the Court con-
cluded that there is simply no conflict between the two jurisdictional pro-
visions. The Court recognized the difficulty of applying this distinc-
tion,"" thus giving rise to the statement that "property does not have rights.
People have rights."' 70 Finally, the Court notes that whatever concern
there might have been, in careful reconciliation of §§1331 and 1343(3)
61. See notes 12 to 34 supra and accompanying text.
62. See cases cited at note 52 supra.
63. Compare Roberts v. Harder, 440 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1971) with Alvarado v.
Schmidt, 317 F. Supp. 1027 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
64. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
65. Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1285,
1287 (1953). Supra note 60, at 1022-25.
66. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 542 (1972).
67. Id. at 543-46, 548-49.
68. Id. at 547. §§1983 and 1343(3) are limited to cases alleging deprivation
of constitutionally guaranteed rights by persons acting under color of state law.
69. See cases cited at notes 48 to 52 supra.
70. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). The
Court also points to the recognition of the falsity of any conceptual dichotomy
between personal liberty and property rights by such eminent theorists as Locke,
J. Adams, and Blackstone. See also Reich, supra note 64.
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to prevent denial of jurisdiction over an important case because of the
amount in controversy requirement, surely does not now obtain in light of
the erosion of the impact of §1331 by other specific jurisdictional stat-
utes which do not contain an amount in controversy requirement. 7 1
The important underlying policy considerations which present funda-
mental reasons for the inception of the personal-property rights distinc-
tion in the first place, and which certainly were partially responsible for
its continued vitality, were at least implicitly dealt with by Lynch. One of
these, often disguising more basic concerns, is that expansive interpreta-
tion of federal jurisdictional statutes will impede the courts' ability to ef-
fectively administer the caseload, because such interpretation would in-
vite a "flood of litigation." It is possible that elimination of the per-
sonal-property rights distinction as a limitation to §1343(3) jurisdiction
may result in an increased caseload.72  But these cases alleging depriva-
tion of constitutional rights by persons acting under color of state law,
present important federal questions,73 which are better litigated in a fed-
eral forum.74  For a Supreme Court which has been especially concerned
71. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 549 n.17 (1972). Stat-
utes which grant jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy and which
apply to cases otherwise falling within §1331 include: admirally and ma:itime
28 U.S.C. §1333; bankruptcy 28 U.S.C. §1334; review of orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission 28 U.S.C. §1336; cases arising under any Act of Congiess
regulating commerce 28 U.S.C. §1337; postal matters 28 U.S.C. §1339; interral
revenue and customs duties actions 28 U.S.C. §1340; election disputcs 28 U.S.C.
§1344; cases in which the United States is a party 28 U.S.C. §§13,15-49, 1358,
1361; tort actions by aliens 28 U.S.C. §1350; actions on bonds executed under
federal law 28 U.S.C. §1352; cases involving Indian allotments 28 U.S.C. §1353
injuries under federal law 28 U.S.C. § 1357.
72. Consider Judge Friendly's admonition in Negron v. Wallace, 436 F.2d 113),
1141 (2d Cir. 1971): ". . . [T]he framers of the Act of 1871 could hardly have
intended it to become the standard method of constitutional attack upon state ac-
tion. . . . Suits under that statute thus should not be lightly brought. Apart from
the burden they impose on federal judges and their abrasive effect on federal state
relations, counsel should never forget Mr. Justice Jackson's observation . . . that
'it must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of
worthless ones.' . . . There is thus a responsibility, resting upon all counsel . . .
not to swell the tidal wave of actions under the civil rights statute by bringing suits
for declaratory or injunctive relief when no need for this exists." (citations omitted).
73. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 546 (1972). But see
Hingle v. Perez, 312 F. Supp. 127, 129 (E.D. La. 1970), where the court argues
that the federal courts should not spend their time on cases involving small pecuniary
value, even though federal questions are presented.
74. ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS (1969), discussed at text accompanying notes 96 to 113 infra (hereinafter
cited as ALI STUDY). But see MOSHER v. Beirne, 237 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Mo.
1964), afl'd, 357 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1966).
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with protection of individual liberties, 75 the Stone formulation necessarily
had to be discarded as an unworkable argument on which to rely as a
means of controlling the "flood of litigation." Thus it was that the dis-
tinction was discarded by the unanimous nod of the seven Justices sitting
on the case, despite vigorous expressions of concern with increasing case-
loads in the federal courts by some of the Justices in other cases. 76
But the more significant policy consideration which inevitably runs
through Lynch is that of the Court's century long struggle with striking a
balance between the need to protect federal rights in a federal court
with the need to protect the respective roles of federal and state courts
in a system of federalism undergoing significant alteration in recent dec-
ades.
7 7
The question then arises as to what the Court has said about this most
fundamental question of federalism in relation to protection of individual
liberties, through its decision in Lynch. Has the Court by having whole-
heartedly repudiated the personal-property rights distinction, as seized
upon by courts to limit the role of the federal judiciary in the protection
of important personal liberties against state action, thereby given credence
to the idea that the common law of civil liberties had truly been nation-
alized by the fourteenth amendment and that the federal courts are the
only appropriate guardians of these rights? 78  Clearly an affirmative
answer to this question would be to overstate the impact of Lynch. But
with an artificial barrier removed, analysis might be made of the kinds of
rights which the courts will protect under §1983, and in defining the lim-
its to the scope of §1983 protections the federal courts will necessarily
give further delineation to the form of modern federalism.
The Civil Rights Act is narrower in scope than general federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, 79 § 1343(3) jurisdiction being limited to state action or
75. See generally McCLosKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 1-10 (1972).
76. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439-43 (1971) (Chief
Justice Burger, dissenting); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Burger, The
State of the Federal Iudiciary-1972, 58 A.B.A.J. 1049 (1972).
77. The concept of an evolving federalism is pointedly addressed to by the ALl
STUDY, supra note 74, at 6: "The objective of this study is that cases be divided
between the state and federal courts in a manner grounded on rational principle.
Access to federal courts should not be frozen into a pattern set in 1789 or 1875,
whether or not the pattern was right to meet the needs of its time, if it does not
make sense in light of conditions in the last half of the twentieth century." See
McCLoSKEY, supra note 75, at 4-5, 45-54. But see Burns, The Death of E Pluribus
Unum, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 651 (1970).
78. For an early pronouncement of this position see 1 BURGESS, POLITICAL SCI-
ENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 227-28 (1890).
79. Kline v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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application of state law.80 Beyond this basic premise, it is instructive to
consider instances where courts have not applied §1983 protections.
Even where the alleged deprivation is due to state action, the courts are
reluctant to infringe upon state taxing power, 81 though denial of relief
may ultimately result in restriction of an underlying constitutional right.
Nor does it extend to protection of rights guaranteed by state law.82  The
protections of §1983 have been narrowly circumscribed by some courts
when dealing with allegations of infringement of employment status, un-
less racial overtones can be shown,83 and have not been extended by
other courts to state laws prohibiting strikes by public employees. 84 Other
examples of denial of jurisdiction may be found, often resulting in the
denial of a hearing to redress an important constitutional right.85
However, a wide range of cases, some directly contradictory to those cited
above, have been granted jurisdiction. Many cases involving welfare rights
have been granted jurisdiction under §1983,86 as have challenges to state
employment tenure laws,8 7 to denial of employee salary benefits at a state
university where free speech was at issue, 88 and to discriminatory dis-
charge from public employment.89 In addition, §1983 protections in-
clude protection of free speech where infringed by obscenity statutes,90
sex discrimination, 91 equitable relief against actions by judicial officers,9 2
80. Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1971). See also Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
81. Hickman v. Wujick, 333 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. N.Y. 1971); Jones v. Township
of North Bergen, 331 F. Supp. 1281 (D.C. N.J. 1971). Contra, Burdman v. Ny-
quist, 332 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. N.Y. 1971). See also Mathews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S.
521 (1931).
82. Stiltner v. Rhay, 332 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1963); O'Connor v. O'Connor,
315 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1963). Cf. Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91 (1944).
83. E.g., Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist. of Lincoln County Ark.,
405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1969).
84. Kieran v. Lindsay, 334 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
85. See, e.g., Papish v. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 331 F. Supp.
1321 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (action to enjoin dismissal of non-resident student of
state university for distribution of allegedly obscene publications).
86. Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1971); McClellan v. University Hts.
Inc., 338 F. Supp. 374 (D. R.I. 1972); Male v. Crossroads Associates, 337 F.
Supp. 1190 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
87. Krzewinsky v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.C. N.J. 1972).
88. Jervey v. Martin, 336 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Va. 1972).
89. Bimbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966). But compare Kieran
v. Lindsay, 334 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. N.Y. 1971). Also Potter v. McQueeny, 338 F.
Supp. 1133 (D.C. R.I. 1972).
90. Amato v. Ruth, 332 F. Supp. 326 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
91. Eslinger v. Thomas, 340 F. Supp. 886 (D. S.C. 1972).
92. Haley v. Troy, 338 F. Supp. 794 (D.C. Mass. 1972); see also McElroy
v. Swan, 457 F.2d 1303 (6th Cir. 1972).
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and voting rights.93
In the cases cited above, where jurisdiction was granted under §
1343(3), the courts frequently proceeded to touch on development of the
basic doctrines making up the structure of the relation today between fed-
eral and state courts.9 4  These standards and tests, as applied to suits to
redress constitutionally protected liberties under the mandates of the Su-
preme Court,9 1 without the troubling shibboleths such as the personal-
property rights distinction, will necessarily result in a clearer picture of
the structure of modern federal-state relations.
Since suits alleging infringement of basic personal liberties, including
those associated with so-called property rights, are usually brought al-
ternatively under §§1331 and 1343(3), and because Lynch has removed
the threshold blockade to discussion of the real issues of federalism in
cases under §1343(3) that might have been denied jurisdiction by the
personal-property rights distinction, it would seem to follow that it is de-
sirable to eliminate the amount in controversy requirement under §1331
as a last remaining impediment to the full treatment of constitutional
rights of individual liberties in the context of the basic issues of federalism.
Based on the suggestion of Mr. Chief Justice Warren, the American
Law Institute completed a study in 1969 of the federal judicial system
reappraising the distribution of business between the federal and state
courts, in the face of rapidly increasing litigation in the federal courts. 6
It is submitted that the decision in Lynch, in having eliminated the per-
sonal-property rights distinction as a limit to §1343(3) jurisdiction, pre-
sents another indication of the expansive trend in the federal courts and
thereby gives import to the proposal to eliminate the amount in contro-
versy requirement under § 1331.91
93. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Leopold v. Young, 340 F. Supp. 1014
(D. Vt. 1972).
94. Particularly: the abstention doctrines [Railroad Commission of Tev as v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Burdman v. Nyquist, 332 F. Supp. 460 (W.D.
N.Y. 1971); WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §52 (2d ed. 1970)]; presenta-
tion of substantial constitutional questions [Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288(1936)] exhaustion of state remedies [WRIGHT, supra at §491; and compelling
state objectives [Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)].
95. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261
(1947); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1964). See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 58 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Note, Federal Jurisdiction-Younger v. Harris: A Current Appraisal
of the Policy Against Federal Court Interference With State Court Proceedings, 21
DEPAUL L. REV. 519 (1971).
96. ALI STUDY, supra note 74, at 1-7.
97. Wechsler, supra note 6, at 222; Friedenthal, New Limits on Federal Juris-
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While cautioning against allowing litigation involving civil rights to
dominate federal question thinking,98 the ALI Study discusses the most
important arguments why suits involving vindication of federally pro-
tected rights should be litigated in a federal forum irrespective of the
monetary value that the suit may represent. These include the special
expertise of federal judges in dealing with constitutional questions, uni-
formity in the application of federal law, and possible hostility or conflict
present in a state court which is called upon to test the constitutionality
of one of the laws of that state. However these reasons are not taken to
conclude that all federal question litigation should be in a federal forum. 99
Further, the ALl Study does note that there are some types of cases
which still suffer from denial of federal jurisdiction because they are of
the limited category still subject to the §1331 amount in controversy re-
quirement, 100 such as deprivation of constitutional rights by federal offi-
cers and deprivation of federal civil service preference rights for vet-
erans.
101
The amount in controversy requirement is the source of other jurisdic-
tional difficulties to litigants. Problems are often encountered by multiple
parties in dealing with aggregation of their claims to meet the amount in
controversy.' 0 2  Courts have been tempted to find their way around the
requirement where it is ". . . not so clearly baseless that the court was
bound to disregard it . . . "103 or by accepting as not speculative allegations
of damages for infringement of rights not easily susceptible to valua-
tion,1 4 even in cases where no relief in damages is sought.' °'5  Even
Judge Friendly in Eisen v. Eastman'0 6 noted that adherence to the Stone
diction, 11 STAN. L. REV. 213, 216-18 (1959); Currie, Federal Courts and the ALl,
Part 11, 36 U. CHi. L. REV. 268 (1969).
98. ALI STUDY, supra note 74, at 163.
99. Id. at 162-68.
100. Id. at 172-73, 491.
101. See Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964). But ser Giancana
v. Johnson, Id. at 371 (Swygert, J., dissenting): "It is incongruous to hold that a
formal allegation of the amount in controversy is necessary when personal liberties
of the magnitude alleged . .. are involved." See also Jackson v. Kuhn, 254 F.2d
555 (8th Cir. 1958); Powers v. Gold, 124 F. Supp. 93 (D. Mass. 1953). For a
challenge to the constitutionality of the amount in controversy requirement see
Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688 (D. R.I. 1969).
102. Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323 (3d Cir. 1965).
103. Empresa Hondurena De Vapores v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222, 226 (2d Cir.
1962).
104. Marquez v. Hardin, 339 F. Supp. 1364 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
105. Bauer v. McLaren, 332 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. Iowa 1971). See also Brown
v. Donielson, 334 F. Supp. 294 (S.D. Iowa 1971).
106. 421 F.2d 560, 566 n.10 (2d Cir. 1969).
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formulation in Hague would result in denial of a federal forum because
of the amount in controversy requirement of §1331 and cited the ALI
Study with approval, and in another case gave broad interpretation to the
scope of 28 U.S.C. §1337, granting jurisdiction of any civil action arising
under any act of Congress regulating commerce, so as to avoid the
amount in controversy problem. 10 7 Finally, at least one court has sug-
gested that in cases where validity of the amount in controversy was
doubtful and the action was triable by jury as of right, that the jury
should determine the amount in controversy to protect plaintiff's right to
jury trial.' 0 8 . Elimination of the amount in controversy requirement cer-
tainly provides the simpler means of protecting individual rights and as-
suring litigation in the most appropriate forum.
The inherent difficulty in using an arbitrary figure as the minimum
amount in controversy to establish jurisdiction is illustrated by the statis-
tics of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts cited in the
ALI Study' 00 which indicate that the majority of the federal question
cases heard to judgment result in awards of less than $10,000 anyway.
Finally, the ALI Study reiterates the argument that elimination of the
amount in controversy requirement would have little impact on the busi-
ness of the federal courts, because of numerous specific jurisdictional
statutes which are exceptions to §1331, including the exception provided
by §1343(3). i °0 The AL! Study discusses the personal-property rights
distinction as commendable so far as it dispenses with the amount in con-
troversy requirement where the suit is to redress a right not capable of
pecuniary valuation, but questions the desirability of the distinction where
it bars cases involving real constitutional issues. 1" By removing this sig-
nificant category of cases where the amount in controversy requirement
might have some effect on limiting litigation in the federal courts under
federal question jurisdiction, the decision in Lynch establishes that the
requirement is no longer consistent with current thinking regarding
proper subject matter jurisdiction and that the ALI proposal should be
adopted,'1 2 with its focus on the proposition that litigants should at least
107. Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n., 388 F.2d 609,
614-15 (2d Cir. 1967).
108. Shaffer v. Coty Inc., 183 F. Supp. 662, 666-67 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
109. ALI STUDY, supra note 74, at 491-92.
110. Id. at 489-91.
111. Id. at 490.
112. The ALl STUDY diffuses the impact of traditional arguments in favor of
the amount in controversy requirement, most importantly that it serves to control
the amount of litigation, by its concurrent proposals regarding diversity jurisdic-
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have a choice of forum in which to vindicate federally protected rights. 113
The early post-Civil War enabling legislation, enacted to give life to
the fourteenth amendment, has undergone a long process of growth as
the Court gradually undertook to intervene on the behalf of an ever larger
number of individual liberties when these were threatened by action un-
der the color of state authority. The Supreme Court in Lynch has prop-
erly discarded the much disputed personal-property rights distinction as a
limitation to federal court intervention, thereby casting new light on the
form of modern national federalism. In so doing, the amount in con-
troversy requirement under federal question jurisdiction appears in con-
flict with court pronouncements encouraging a free choice of the federal
forum in which to vindicate important constitutional rights without arbi-
trary limitations, and as controlled only by the more substantial issues of
federalism such as are found in the abstention doctrines.
George H. Olsen
tion which would shift many cases presently litigated in federal courts to state courts.
ALI STUDY, supra note 74, at 1-7, 99-110, 458-64.
113. ALI STUDY, supra note 74, at 173.
